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Abstract The joint-liability lending model in microcredit predicts social ties
between groups of borrowers to incentivise repayment. However, it also pro-
motes free riding behaviour. Repeated experimental games conducted in Ban-
gladesh are used to empirically analyse key theoretical hypotheses predicted
under joint-liability (repeated experimental games are conducted by the author
on the field in Manikganj, Dhaka, Bangladesh in December 2014); treated
groups of microcredit borrowers are compared to control groups of non-
microcredit borrowers alongside questionnaire findings. Treated individuals
forego short-run gains from non-repayment and benefit from higher long-run
gains from progressing on to further rounds. The paper also finds that treated
individuals are significantly less likely to free ride and more likely to shoulder
for their partner compared to control individuals. Optimal individual and group
characteristics to maximise repayment under joint-liability are then identified.
Keywords Microcredit . Joint-liability . Social ties . Free riding . Repeated games
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“Give a man a fish and he will eat for a day. Give a woman microcredit, and she,
her husband, her children, and her extended family will eat for a lifetime” (Bono
2010, page 1).
But who feeds (repays) the lender?
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Introduction
Microcredit has grown exponentially since 1983 and is viewed as a revolutionary tool
for global poverty alleviation (Yunus 1999).1 The rise in prominence is attributed to the
joint-liability lending model pioneered by Grameen Bank whereby traditional lender
requirements for physical collateral are bypassed through mutual responsibility for
individual loans. Theoretical hypotheses predict microcredit groups outperform others
in the joint-liability setting, however the extent to which this contributes to repayment
rates in excess of 95 % in microcredit remains unexplained. The shift in world industry
structure toward for-profit lenders2 means sustainability of this annual US$ 38 billion3
global market is contingent on the application of these theories in practice.
Theoretical hypotheses predict sustainable long-run repayment as microcredit
groups foster positive non-economic social ties from interactions. From a borrower
perspective, joint-liability suggests individuals in microcredit groups show moral
discipline by foregoing short-run benefits from non-repayment in preference for
long-run dynamic gains from repayment. Joint-liability success utilises social ties
between microcredit borrowers (Besley and Coate 1995; Ghatak and Guinnane
1999); however it incentivizes free riding (Kono 2013). There remains dispute
among lenders on the optimal observable individual and group characteristics to
maximise repayment.
Empirical results from repeated experimental games used to model joint-liability
settings are applied alongside questionnaire findings to test the theoretical hypotheses,
with particular focus on differences between treated microcredit borrower groups
compared to the control non-microcredit borrower groups.4 The author conducts the
games in the district of Manikganj, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Results from the joint-liability games show evidence of treated groups more likely
choosing repayment and subsequently partaking in more rounds compared to control
groups. This holds even controlling for unobservable development of relationships over
time among treated groups. Treated individuals also comparatively forego short-run
gains from non-repayment to benefit from higher long-run dynamic gains. Furthermore
they are less likely to free ride and more likely to shoulder (support) partners compared
to controls, suggesting relative fostering of social ties. From a lender perspective, this
paper identifies characteristics including female-gender and neighbours that optimise
1 Muhammad Yunus, the founder of microcredit, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.
2 MIX Market database 2009: 490 of 1169 Monetary Conditions Index MCIs (42 %) were for profit-MCIs,
controlling two-thirds of the assets deployed. A notable for-profit MCI is Banco Compartamos (Swibel 2007;
Chu and Cuellar 2008).
3 MIX “MicroBanking Bulletin Issue #19. December, 2009, pp.49”: 74 million people held microloans
totalling US$38 billion in 2009.
4 Henceforth, treated (microcredit) groups refer to those that are actively jointly-liable for a microcredit loan at
present. Control (non-microcredit) groups are otherwise, which includes microcredit borrowers from different
groups, as this paper focuses on isolating social ties as the determinant of differences in experimental games.
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repayment. However it finds factors such as income and age are insignificant contrary
to popular thought.
Related Literature
Microcredit gained traction subsequent to implementation of joint-liability lending. 5
Between 1997 and 2005 the number of clients increased by 740 % and institutions by
406 %.6 Higher market concentration and transition toward for-profit lenders demand
repayment rates in excess of 95 % for sustainability (Hossain 1988; Morduch 1999).7
Theoretically, joint-liability success revolves around social ties within groups which
counteract three key problems:8 moral hazard9 (Banerjee et al. 1994; Laffont and Rey
2003), adverse selection10 (Ghatak 1999; Gangopadhyay et al. 2005), and free riding11
(Besley and Coate 1995; Wydick 2001; Bhole and Ogden 2010). This paper isolates free
riding, extending games by Kono (2013) by setting income exogenously and randomly
selecting participants to control for moral hazard and adverse selection respectively.
Focusing therefore on social ties12 as a solution to free riding, Besley and Coate
(1995) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) theoretically prove high social ties deter group
member shirking on repayments.13 The former model defines benefits from repaying
through dynamic incentives14 of future loans and avoiding social punishment. The latter
uses historic and contemporary examples as proof, although there is ambiguity on the
extent social ties explain the increased repayment.
Cason et al. (2012) and Zeller (1998) empirically show stronger social ties lead to
improved repayment rates and lender profitability if it exceeds monitoring costs.
Abbink et al. (2006) finds group-lending to outperform individual-lending, although
curiously self-selected groups show a higher yet less stable willingness to repay. This
variance can be explained by contagion, a subset of group free riding where dominant
strategy for individuals is to default should they observe high likelihood of default by
5 Joint-liability lending is interchangeable with group lending. It applies to 68 % of all borrowers (Lapenu and
Zeller 2002).
6 See Daley-Harris 2012; for statistics on growth of MCIs.
7 Government credit programs have less than 25 % repayment rates (Adams and Vogel 1986; Braverman and
Guasch 1986).
8 See Freixas and Rochet 1997 for the key problems for lenders of capital.
9 See Stiglitz 1990; Varian (1990) for further theory on moral hazard.
10 See Akerlof 1970 for further theory on adverse selection.
11 See Olson 1965 for further theory on free-riding.
12 Social ties is interchangeable with the term social capital, defined as “features of social organisation such as
trust, norms, and networks that can improve efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam
et al. 1994, p. 67).
13 Future inability to access loans should the group collectively be unable to repay their liabilities is an
effective dynamic incentive device (Stiglitz and Weiss 1983). The threat of future retaliation induces
cooperative behaviour (Bó 2005).
14 In reality many MCIs (e.g. Grameen Bank) do not impose future participation punishments (Todd 1996;
Rahman 1999)
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the group. Contagion in joint-liability is evident in Mexico (Allen 2012), Pakistan
(Kurosaki and Khan 2012) and India (Breza 2012). Abbink et al. (2006) provides
evidence that the larger the loans, the bigger the incentive to free ride although the less
lender and group tolerance toward defaulters. Inability to control behavioural
endogeneity which positively influences social ties and repayment is persistent across
empirics.
The counter-hypothesis is social ties reduce repayment through forgiveness toward
defaults (Guinnane 1994). Empirical study by Wydick (1999) and Cassar et al. (2007)
applying games by Abbink et al. (2006) in Guatemala, South Africa, and Armenia
respectively emphasise no significant gains from social ties, particularly for the latter
comparing acquaintance groups against strangers.15 The unobservable social ties are
however measured by weakly correlated proxy dependant variables in the game
structure which invalidate findings.
Theoretical research into changes from joint-liability to individual-liability
hypothesise decreases in repayment ceteris paribus for groups with sufficient
social ties (Banerjee et al. 1994), empirical examples being Peru where there is
positive correlation between intra-group trustworthiness and strong social ties
with higher repayment rates (Karlan 2005; Karlan 2007). In contrast, other
experiments show no difference after change from joint to individual liability
(Giné and Yang 2009; Giné and Karlan 2009). Against popular literature, the
latter deems excessive pressure of joint-liability to discourage good borrowers.
The consensus however supports social ties, alongside features such as dynamic
incentives and frequent installment as important drivers of repayment rather
than joint-liability itself (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2010). Townsend
(2003) describes under theories of selection the ambiguity of Pareto optimal
regimes subject to exogenous environmental characteristics. Joint-liability as a
cure to free riding cannot be exemplified through one theory.
Comparing alternative game structures, findings in Malawi suggest no difference in
repayment between joint and individual-liability (Schaefer-Kehnert 1980). Kono
(2006) counter-intuitively finds Vietnamese borrowers have lower repayment rates
under joint-liability, even with peer monitoring and punishments through social ties.
Thai microcredit programs show similar patterns of negative effects on repayment from
social ties. Positive gains to repayment are found to be possible only through high local
sanctions and correlated returns (Ahlin and Townsend 2007). Critically, however, the
empirics did not control for other lending characteristics and endogenous selection of
borrowers, and questions are raised at the excess regional variability. Kono (2013)
bypasses endogeneity problems in conducting framed joint-liability experiments in
Vietnam. His empirical findings conclude free-riding exceeds players helping group
members, resulting in relative underperformance of joint-liability.
To the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate differences in
repayment decisions between treated groups of microcredit borrowers and control
groups of non-microcredit borrowers in identical joint-liability settings through game
theoretical application. Attanasio et al. (2001) and Duflo et al. (2013) pioneered
comparisons with treated groups. However, the studies focus on poverty alleviation
for women and development effects respectively.
15 This contradicts Giné et al. 2010, who suggests the opposite.
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Model
This paper models joint-liability settings through repeated experimental games to
compare actions of treated microcredit groups against control non-microcredit groups,
and in particular identifies the role of social ties versus free riding. The methodology
used extends the model of repayment decisions utilised by Kono (2013).
The game is designed where at the beginning of each round each player i is allocated
a stochastic income gi∈ 0; gi½  which is independent and identically distributed over
individuals and rounds, representing exogenous investment returns funded by the loans.
16 Players in an n-person group are required to pay a repayment sum of nB collectively.
Player i first chooses the action ri of whether to repay personal liability, B. If yes
(ri=B), then player i is given the choice to shoulder (repay) di toward any remaining
group liabilities. Repayment is dynamically incentivised as participation in the next






di ¼ nB. Otherwise, all
members in the group are eliminated. This represents borrowers only being able to
access further loans subject to full group repayment under joint-liability irrespective of
individual repayment decisions.17 The discount factor, λ, is applied between periods to
replicate a finite time horizon to the games where irrespective of outcome the game
may end with probability 1/6 after each round (λ=5/6).18 Utility for player i of not
receiving loans (thus inability to invest) is 0.
The model assumes for two-player groups (n=2) that all players are unable to engage
in any strategic interaction within groups outside of the experiment,19 and that each stage
is independent from the previous (players cannot save income from past periods). In
contrast to prior experiments, imperfect monitoring is assumed whereby players cannot
observe their groupmembers’ income levels and decisions, and can only observe personal
income, gi, and personal decisions ri and di; hence players are unable to determine with







di < nB, player i loses ri+di as the lender does not return an individual’s
repayment.20 Lender terms are not considered and are assumed to be homogenous as it
does not contribute to the paper’s focus on individual choice in a joint-liability setting.
The order of the decisions in round t can be summarised as follows:
1. Players i=1,2 are allocated stochastic income gi and simultaneously choose their
repayment amount, ri, where i=1,2. The decisions (ri, rj) are observed by both
players.
2a. If ri= rj=B then both players have met group repayment conditions for the round.
16 Moral hazard is excluded as player incomes (returns on investment), g, are independent of their actions.
17 Inability for individuals to access future loans should the group default is an effective dynamic incentive
device (Stiglitz and Weiss 1983). The threat of future retaliation induces cooperative behaviour (Bó 2005).
18 Assume λE(g) < 2B to exclude players having a dominant strategy of always repaying regardless.
19 Unrealistic as borrowers of microcredit live in the same community; to control for this experiment decisions
are made face-to-face (Kono 2014). Borrowers cannot enter binding contracts and outcomes are from repeated
interactions.
20 Applies in reality assuming no strategic interaction between players such that players are unable to interact
and agree on their decisions prior to repayment (contrary to model by Besley and Coate 1995).
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2b. If ri=B but rj<B, j≠ i, then player i has the option of shouldering (paying) di=B
− rj for the deficit of player j. By joint-liability, both players meet group repay-
ment conditions for the round only in the scenario where player i pays the full
deficit of player j. Vice versa if rj=B but ri<B, j≠ i.
2c. If ri, rj<B, both players have not met group repayment conditions for the round
(group default) and are eliminated.







di ¼ nB, progression onto the next round is conditional on the dis-
count factor λ=5/6.
4. Both players in groups that progress participate in a further repetition in round t+1.
Experimental Procedures
The repeated experimental game is conducted in five rural villages in Manikganj,
Bangladesh in December 2014. The experiments are conducted in village centres on
random groups of n=2 players, sampling 10 % of the population from each village.
Participating players first complete a verbal questionnaire before an explanation on
taking part in the game.21 This includes information on variables including if the group
is a treated microcredit or control non-microcredit group.22
The repeated game is then administered. Stochastic income for each player at the start
of each period is privately allocated through the sum of the points of three randomly
allocated cards, each representing either 10 points or 0 points forming three possible
income values: g∈{0, 10, 20}. 23 The probability distribution of gi is determined by
q= (q0,q10,q20) where given qg=Pr(gi=g), let q= (25%,25%,50%). Each player then
simultaneously submits a card face down to represent repayment (10) or default (0).
Should player i default, player j is then given the option of shouldering and must submit
a further card face down to shoulder on their behalf (10) or otherwise (0). Players have
satisfied group liabilities upon total group repayment of value 20. If satisfied, progress
onto the next repeated round is contingent on not rolling six on a standard six-sided dice.
24 Figure 1 illustrates the game tree for player i in the repeated experimental game.
Players are given economic incentives in the field experiments to better reflect
reality. Each player earns a fixed fee of 50 taka for the opportunity cost of participation,
and a variable bonus of 10 taka for each 10 card that is unused for repayment and
accumulated at game end. This replicates incentives of short-run gains from free riding
and long-run gains from cooperation to participate in future rounds.
To prevent implications on external social ties, players cannot observe group member’s
income levels (cards allocated). Proshikar25 also runs a regional monopoly in microcredit
21 Questionnaire is done prior to the game as otherwise the game outcomes may affect questionnaire answers
(Kono 2014).
22 microcredit is the key independent dummy variable of note.
23 Minimum income is 0 (three cards of 0 points) and maximum income is 20 (two cards of 10 points, one
card of 0 points).
24 This represents the discount factor and satisfies Abbink et al. (2006)’s finite horizon games.
25 Proshikar (NGO) is the sole lender of microcredit in Manikganj and is the third largest lender in
Bangladesh.
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lending in Manikganj, hence it is rational to assume near homogenous terms of lending to
treated groups.26
Dataset
The dataset records 430 players forming 215 groups sampling 10 % of the population
by five villages in Manikganj. Treated groups make up 40 % which is upward biased
given the willingness for microcredit borrowers to participate.27 Summary statistics
show a balanced range of observations. Gender is split male: female at 49: 51 overall,
but 64 % female in the treated groups confirming preference toward female empow-
erment by lenders. Age follows a quadratic relationship with the majority of the sample
between 21 and 40 years old28; treated groups contribute strongly as microcredit is
directed toward the most able-bodied (86 % treated, 58 % control). Muslims make up
91 % with the Hindu 9 % minority predominantly from Shahapara.29 No significant
religious differences for treated groups suggests Islamic principles against lending are
not practised due to necessity for credit.
Statistics document low financial-economic status with 31 % of workers earning below
the poverty line of “$1-a-day” (Ravallion et al. 2009). 30 Forty-four percent of treated
individuals (22 % of control) live below the threshold, providing evidence of microcredit
geared toward poverty alleviation. Agriculture is the predominant occupation (51 %)
followed by garments (11 %) and labour (8 %) given proximity to garment factories and
brick-fields. Socio-economic status is poor; 54% report no education and 67% are educated
below expected literacy.31 There has however been improvement as parental education
26 The degree of non-economic factors (social ties and free riding) fostered are assumed to be positive and
consistent across treated groups. In reality, joint-liability may have negative non-economic influence
(Angelucci et al. 2013). This may be resultant of extortionate interest rates causing repayment pressures to
damage social ties (Polgreen and Bajaj 2010).
27 Proshikar’s database on Manikganj estimates microcredit penetration at approximately 35 %.
28 Given the financial nature of the game, those below 18 were not ethically allowed to participate and
randomly replaced.
29 Problems of multicolinearity as a result are checked and corrected.
30 Housewives excluded as they report zero income.
31 Literacy is expected after studying beyond class 4.
Fig. 1 Game tree
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records 76 % with none and 87 % below literacy. Households are large with the
mean number of children, siblings and dependants at 2.1, 2.2 and 2.2 respec-
tively. Smoking is reported by 3 %, however this is dropped due to misrepre-
sentation given its negative connotation with lending is well-known. There are
no significant group differences in age or education for the treated, although
there is suggestion that gender, job and income differences are minimized in
treated groups. The premise is improved social ties in homogenous groups.
Theoretical Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
Treated microcredit groups are more sustainable borrowers than control
non-microcredit groups under joint-liability.
Individuals in treated groups choose repayment and subsequently progress
onto more rounds compared to control groups under joint-liability controlling
for other characteristics. Theory hypothesises stronger social ties from past
interactions to promote non-economic factors of cooperation and trust within
treated groups, hence more rounds are played in the repeated games. This effect
is forecasted to increase positively with the number of years the group has been
together.
Hypothesis 2
Treated microcredit groups forego short-run gains from non-repayment in preference
for long-run dynamic gains compared to control non-microcredit groups under
joint-liability.
Treated group individuals are predicted to earn less income in the short-run given
rounds played as they choose repayment, but dynamic gains from participation in more
total rounds as a consequence leads to higher total income overall compared to control
groups. Theory anticipates treated groups show moral discipline; they forego short-run
gains preferring that longer-term gains from future loans. The hypothesis also expects
mutual gains from lending to treated groups: lenders are more likely repaid and treated
borrowers make higher long-run gains.
Hypothesis 3
Developments in non-economic factors foster social ties which encourage shouldering
and discourage free riding within treated microcredit groups compared to control
non-microcredit groups.
Treated groups show significant development of social ties which promote
shouldering (supporting partners) and deter free riding as a consequence of
non-economic factors increasing cooperation and relationships. Theoretically
treated groups are significantly more likely to shoulder (support) their partner
and less likely to free ride compared to control groups under joint-liability
(Besley and Coate 1995; Ghatak and Guinnane 1999).
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Hypothesis 4
Lenders can maximise repayment rates under joint-liability by selecting individuals/
groups that meet optimal characteristics.
Theory suggests various observable characteristics of individuals and groups that can
maximise repayment decisions. Controlling for differences between treated and control
groups, there are optimal physical, individual, relational, and group characteristics.32
Literature on physical characteristics supports female lending as females are risk
averse with loan investment (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2010) and are
genetically dutiful with payments (D’Espallier et al. 2011). Lenders also choose to
lend to the able-bodied aged 20 to 30, who are most likely to earn repayment returns
and to seize the initiative for future loans.
From a relational perspective, blood relatives and neighbours likely have the
strongest social ties, albeit at marginal risk that they anticipate a partner’s bad repay-
ment behaviour. Inconclusive evidence suggests that the group support mentality
increases with marriage, children, siblings, and dependants. Conversely, emotional
constraints may reduce the willingness to support additional others. Popular thought
suggests that higher parental education is positively correlated with childhood teach-
ings on right-and-wrong, and that village differences affect social ties.
Predictions regarding individual attributes are uncertain. Increased education in-
creases repayment due to the strong positive correlation with good behaviour, however
educated players may attempt to cheat the system. Similarly higher incomes and
savings mean relative repayments are less of a burden, but also diminish the dynamic
incentive for future loans. Optimal job guidelines are broad, allowing for any possibil-
ity that loan investment can be made into self-employment schemes.
Maximum repayment is anticipated from homogenous groups on the premise that
they show improved social ties. Group members build stronger relationship when
related in age, education and gender. Similar lifestyles and challenges from equal
income, occupation and marital status also positively impact group repayment.
Empirical Results
Empirical findings from the questionnaire and repeated experimental games are record-
ed and analysed. The field experiments are used to empirically test the four key
theoretical hypotheses proposed in “Theoretical Hypotheses.” The cross-sectional data
is econometrically analysed by ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) binary estimation.
The key dependant variables analysed are as follows: roundsmeasures sustainability
of joint-liability, counting the number of rounds the group plays and repays. Points
represent total earnings by the individual for the duration of the game (number of 10
cards accumulated and unused for repayment). Binary variables shoul and free
32 The objective of the questionnaire used by MCIs to decide borrowers is to determine eligibility based on
expected optimal characteristics for repayment. Recall that this paper bases its questions (variables) on those
used by Proshikar.
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determine whether an individual chose to shoulder or free ride respectively throughout
the game.
Preliminary Findings
Preliminary analyses illustrated in Fig. 2 suggest treated groups perform differ-
ently than control groups as hypothesised. Treated groups have a 91 % higher
mean rounds played at 4.18 rounds versus 2.20 rounds for control groups. They
also score 53 % more points on average (1.90 versus 1.24 points) throughout
the duration of the game. This provides evidence treated groups comparatively
play more rounds and score more total points.
Of treated individuals, 79 % shouldered for partners compared to 59 % for the
controls as in Fig. 3. Treated players are also significantly less likely to free ride at only
15 % compared to 40 % in control groups. There is the suggestion of comparatively




To determine sustainability under joint-liability between treated and control
groups, an OLS regression with dependant variable rounds and the main
explanatory variable microcredit is analysed. Model C in Table 1 shows the
final output given by:
rounds ¼ αþ β1microcredit þ β2sexþ β3blood rel þ β4see houseþ β5i:vill þ β6i:educþ β7i:job
þ β8 educ diff þ β9 job diff þ ε
Model C provides evidence verifying that treated microcredit groups are significant-
ly more sustainable borrowers than control groups. Treated groups play 1.771 more
rounds compared to controls, all other significant covariates held constant. Robustness
of the finding is confirmed as the hypothesis holds true when introducing further
insignificant covariates based on the literature and on all observed variables with
Fig. 2 Illustrations of preliminary findings: points scored and rounds played
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treated groups partaking in 1.723 and 1.711 more rounds respectively compared to
control groups.
Minor Model: Rounds Controlling for Relationship over Time
To isolate the difference in sustainability between treated and control groups controlling
for relationship development from past interactions under the joint-liability setting in
treated groups, the covariate years_partner is added as a proxy for unobservable
growth in cooperation and trust. The extendedModel D in Table 1 shows the following:
rounds ¼ αþ β1microcredit þ β2years partner þ β3sexþ β4blood rel þ β5see houseþ β6i:vill
þ β7 i: educþ β8 i: jobþ β9 educ diff þ β10 job diff þ ε
In line with theory, the coefficient on years_partner dictates that treated
groups play 0.486 more rounds for every additional year of having taken
microcredit loans together, suggesting increasing social ties with past interac-
tions. Introducing this proxy for relationship development over time explains
48.5 %33 of the difference between treated and control groups in Model C;
hypothesis 1 still holds true as treated groups nevertheless play 0.912 more
rounds than controls ceteris paribus. This result unambiguously supports
joint-liability, suggesting sustainable repayment by groups entrusted with loans
comparable to otherwise controlling for relationship growth over time. This
suggests success in passing responsibility onto borrowers and in lender initia-
tives such as group meetings and local ambassadors, although further research
beyond the dataset is required.
Note the coefficient onmicrocredit is likely negatively biased as growth in social ties
over time outside of borrowing situations may exponentially impact control groups
more and is not controlled for as relationship measures are subjective. However the
assumption that this affects all groups linearly (constant marginal returns to relationship




Fig. 3 Illustrations of preliminary findings: shouldering and free riding
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Table 1 Hypothesis 1 OLS regression results











































development) means the bias should not significantly change the difference in rounds
played between treated and control groups.
Testing Hypothesis 2
Major Model: Points
To analyse long-run gains to joint-liability borrowers, an OLS regression is run on
points from the experimental games with the main independent variable of microcredit
among other covariates. Model C in Table 2 shows:
points ¼ αþ β1microcredit þ β2sexþ β3i:vill þ β4i:parental educþ β5relig þ β6house income
þ β7 saveþ β8 i: jobþ ε
Results validate the theoretical predictions under Hypothesis 2 as treated
groups accumulate 0.589 more points than controls ceteris paribus. This is
interpreted as earning a significantly higher total income of 5.89 taka compar-
atively from the experimental games. It is supported by findings in Hypothesis
1 where treated groups play more rounds as it is logical to assume additional
rounds lead to more points accumulated given the nature of the game. Robust-
ness checks including covariates based on theory and all observable variables
find the hypothesis holds, with treated groups scoring significantly more points
0.607 and 0.612 respectively.
Table 1 (continued)












• ***,**,* correspond to the coefficient being significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively
• Bold correspond to main variable
• Italics correspond to binary (dummy) variables
• [square brackets] correspond to base level
Source: Author’s experimental data
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Table 2 Hypothesis 2 OLS regression result







microcredit 0.589*** −0.160 −0.280***
‘control’ rounds 0.428*** 0.428***
sex 0.369**
see_house −0.243* −0.268**
vill [borundi] *** *** ***
vill_koitta −0.383** −0.269** −0.212*
vill_rajibpur 0.174 −0.131 −0.274
vill_shah −1.958*** −1.207*** −1.193***
vill_kazi 0.248 −0.168 −0.118
par_educ [none] *** *** ***
peduc_c1 1.769*** −0.191 0.258
peduc_c2 −0.198 −0.298 −0.291
peduc_c3 −0.595*** −0.236 −0.234
peduc_c4 −0.0406 0.181 0.247
peduc_c5 −0.379 −0.471 −0.277
peduc_c6 −0.114 −0.300 −0.324
peduc_c7 1.268*** 0.622*** 0.647***
peduc_c9 0.326 −0.0179 −0.0380
peduc_c10 0.00656 −0.255 −0.259
peduc_olevel −0.137 −0.182 −0.140
peduc_alevel −0.158 −0.860*** −0.941***
relig 0.963*** 1.115*** 1.045***
house_income −2.69e-06* −1.51e-06* −1.71e-06**
save 3.15e-06*














Major Model: Points Controlling for Rounds
To test if treated groups forego short-run gains, a similar OLS regression is modelled
with points as the dependant variable and microcredit as the main independent variable,
however this time including ‘controls’ for rounds. Model D in Table 2 shows the
specification:
points ¼ αþ β1microcredit þ β2sexþ β3i:vill þ β4i:parental educþ β5relig þ β6house income
þ β7 saveþ β8 i: jobþ0 controls0 þ ε
Table 2 (continued)























Constant 1.333*** 0.595*** 0.621***
Observations 430 430 396
R-squared 0.144 0.528 0.397
• ***,**,* correspond to the coefficient being significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively
• Bold correspond to main variable
• Italics correspond to binary (dummy) variables
• [square brackets] correspond to base level
Source: Author’s experimental data
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By controlling for rounds the interpretation of coefficients is the difference in points
scored for a fixed number of rounds played. Hypothesis 2 predicts a significantly negative
coefficient on microcredit as treated groups are theoretically predicted to show moral
discipline and repay in each round, thus earning less over rounds than had they shirked.
Empirical findings confirm a negative coefficient of −0.160, however it is statistically
insignificant. Further inspection of Fig. 4 infers a problem of lack of observations above
six rounds played by control groups. The regression in Model D+ in Table 2 is run as a
correction, restricting observations up to six rounds played.34 Microcredit becomes signif-
icant and treated groups score 0.280 fewer points than controls for fixed rounds played as
hypothesised; treated groups indeed forego 2.80 taka of short-run gains from non-repayment.
Testing Hypothesis 3
Major Model: Shouldering
Maximum likelihood estimation is used focusing on probit35 binary estimation results
for the variable shoul to test if treated groups show a higher likelihood of shouldering
compared to control groups. The main independent variable is microcredit as in Probit
C in Table 3:
shoul ¼ αþ β1microcredit þ β2ageþ β3sexþ β4see houseþ β5childrenþ β6i:vill þ β7relig þ β8i:job
þ β9 school diff þ ε
Relatively stronger social ties in treated groups predict fostering of non-economic
factors toward shouldering for a partner’s repayment. Empirically, treated groups are
indeed 26.6 % more likely to shoulder compared to control groups ceteris paribus.
Results are consistent and significant applying alternative estimation methods of logit
estimation (Logit C) and linear probability model (LPM C); 25.7 and 22.9 % more
likely for the treated, respectively. Robustness checks are confirmed on Probit A and
Probit B models.
Major Model: Free Riding
Econometric techniques are next applied to the variable free for which the hypothesis
anticipates microcredit to have a significant negative coefficient. The interpretation is
that treated groups have a lower likelihood of free riding compared to control groups.
As in Probit C in Table 3:
free ¼ αþ β1microcredit þ β2sexþ β3blood rel þ β4i:vill þ β5house income
þ β6i:jobþ ε
34 Restricting observations is a second-best solution to gathering more data. Restricted observations are
empirically analysed; there is no evidence of having removed a specific subset of the sample aside from
treated groups.
35 Probit estimation is chosen as adjudged by past literature. The assumptions of normally distributed error
terms are made.
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Results show individuals in treated groups are 27.4% significantly less likely to free ride
on their partner as hypothesised. This provides evidence toward stronger social ties within
treated groups, and is further confirmed by consistent findings when applying alternative
estimation methods of Logit C and LPM C, 25.8 and 26.2 % less likely respectively.
Interpretation of Independent Variables for Shouldering and Free Riding
Different factors variably influence non-economic social tie drivers of shouldering and
free riding when comparing the significance of covariates36 holding constant differ-
ences between treated and control groups.
Physically, females are 17.3 % more likely to shoulder and 10.1 % less likely to free
ride than male counterparts as reconciled by gender economics (D’Espallier et al. 2011).
Each additional year in age increases shouldering probability by 1 %. This suggests
younger generations are less inclined to help partners, whether to avoid income loss or
weaker social ties given fewer years in the community, yet this is not reflecting in free
riding for which character dominates and is constant irrespective of age.
Relationship factors show neighbours are 20.3 % more likely to shoulder and blood
relatives 18.2 %; less likely to free ride. Overlap whereby blood relatives locate in close
proximity to neighbours distorts individual effects, but there is clear overall signifi-
cance. Furthermore each additional child decreases the likelihood of shouldering by
8.9 % as parent’s face emotional constraints. For each additional child’s needs they are
less inclined to help borrowing partners. Culturally, Hindus are 40.2 % more likely to
shoulder than Muslims, all else constant, due to collectiveness among the religious
minority in Manikganj.37 There are also significant differences between villages, with
36 See Table 3. Comparisons are distinguished from respective significant covariates in Probit C Models for
shoul and free.
37 89.5 % of Hindus sampled reside in the village of Shahapara.
Fig. 4 Bar chart to show mean points scored between treated and control groups, over rounds
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Table 3 Hypothesis 3 free riding and shouldering binary estimation results




































Correctly Classified 74.41 % 77.60 %
• ***,**,* correspond to the coefficient being significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively
• Bold correspond to main variable
• Ital i cs correspond to binary (dummy) variables
• [square brackets] correspond to baselevel
• - dashes correspond to omitted variables because of colinearity
•Marginal effects are reported for maximum likelihood estimations (Probit and Logit Model s) in the space for
coefficients
Source: Author’s experimental data
122 H.R. Chowdhury
inconclusive proof that smaller populations show comparatively stronger internal social
ties. Free riding shows no difference given character is its main driver which is
ambiguous over religion and children.
For individual variables, each additional taka of annual household income decreases
the probability of free riding by 0.320 % as there is reduced necessity for guaranteed
short-run earnings. Surprisingly this is not replicated for shouldering but the explana-
tion is that relationship factors dominate. Occupation significantly explains shouldering
and free riding. Of particular note are housewives and woodcutters compared to
agriculture due to the prior fostering motherly behaviour and strong social ties in
occupational community in the latter.
Group differences in age, gender, marital status, income and occupation to optimise
non-economic factors is minimally significant contrary to popular thought regarding
homogeneity. There is only a suggestion that each additional year gap in schooling
between partners increases shouldering. This may be due to the highly educated pitying
partners and the lowly educated supporting inferiority.
Testing Hypothesis 4
OLS regression specifications in Table 4 with rounds as the dependant variable are used
to identify optimal characteristics to maximise joint-liability repayment. Rounds are a
measure of returns to lenders as further rounds are contingent on group repayment.
Initial specifications on individual and group characteristics are refined for combination
toward optimal characteristics38 specified below. Note microcredit is retained to control
for differences between treated and control groups.
rounds ¼ αþ β1microcredit þ β2sexþ β3blood rel þ β4see houseþ β5i:vill þ β6i:educþ β7i:job
þ β8 educ diff þ β9 job diff þ ε
The physical optimum in favour of female empowerment is to lend to females who
are more sustainable borrowers, playing 0.934 more rounds than male counterparts.
Age is not seen to impact repayment choice, disproving the notion of young workers
having stronger motivation to repay future loans to escape poverty. However this
overlooks age affecting ability to work and generate income for repayment as game
income is set exogenously independent of productivity.
Based on relationships, lenders maximizing repayment from blood relatives
and neighbours depicts strong social ties as hypothesised, playing 0.641 and
0.915 more rounds than otherwise. Cooperation is higher and there is signifi-
cant opportunity cost of punishment from losing trust in these groups. The data
also find no significant evidence to select borrowers based on children, siblings,
dependants or upbringing based on parental education affecting the helping
mentality. There is however significant varying strength of cultural relationships
between village groups, although further research is required to pinpoint
drivers.39
0 89.5 % of Hindus sampled reside in the village of Shahapara.
38 Notice the Optimal Characteristics specification is the same as Model C in Table 1, as expected.
39 Duflo et al. (2013) indeed find evidence of MCIs targeting borrower groups based on village of residence.
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Table 4 Hypothesis 4 OLS regression results












































Focusing on the individual, lower education promotes repayment, confirming the theory
that better educated players attempt to ‘cheat the system’ by not repaying. Significant levels
are at Class 7, O-Level and Masters who participate in 1.565, 0.980 and 1.535 rounds less
than baseline no education, respectively. The financial variables of income and savings are
insignificant in influencing repayment. The story may be that increases in income or
savings lead to less repayment burden but also less dynamic incentive for future loans
which trade-off perfectly in equilibrium. It is more likely, however, that by setting income
exogenously and not incorporating the possibility of financial losses, borrowers do not act
realistically based on financials. Against acceptance of a broad return on jobs, the analysis
finds more significance should be placed on occupation. There are higher long-run
repayments from workers in predominantly niche forms of employment that form small
work-communities as they better cooperate: messengers (+2.245), fisherman (+1.962),
craftsman (+3.765) and woodcutters (+1.593) play more rounds than baseline agriculture
workers who make up 51 % of sampled treated borrowers.
Optimal group criteria suggest same sex groups perform better by 0.483 rounds
compared to others, however, it is inconclusive when controlling for individual char-
acteristics. Robustness checks confirm repayment differences due to individual gender
explain the majority of the variation in group gender. Age difference is insignificant
disproving less cooperation for bigger age gaps between partners. Partners with
differing education levels play 0.450 less rounds than the identically educated. Highly
educated players chose non-repayment to attempt to cheat lenders and their partners,
particularly if educational differences exist with the latter. Group income disparity
shows no significance which can be explained by similar lifestyles over the range of
incomes observed. Negative non-economic factors such as jealousy are not problematic
as the population has 90,413 taka mean annual household income with 48,058 standard
deviation.40 The availability of goods for conspicuous consumption is constrained and
anyone with high income relocates away from rural villages. Moreover homogenous
job groups outperform others by 0.450 rounds, placing importance on relationships
within work communities.
40 Augsburg et al. 2012 finds no income gains to microcredit borrowers in Bosnia suggesting no social
jealousy toward them.
Table 4 (continued)






• ***,**,* correspond to the coefficient being significant at the 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively
• Bold correspond to main variable
• Italics correspond to binary (dummy) variables
• [square brackets] correspond to base level
Source: Author’s experimental data
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Concluding Remarks
Pioneering repeated experimental games are modelled to evaluate social ties and free
riding under practical joint-liability microcredit borrowing in Bangladesh. Focus is
given to repayment decisions by treated microcredit borrower-groups compared to
control non-microcredit groups. The paper hypothesises and empirically challenges
key theories.
Empirical evidence supports theoretical predictions of more sustainable treated
groups likely repaying loans and participating in more rounds compared to control
groups. Treated groups foster positive non-economic social ties from repeated interac-
tions. This holds controlling for past joint-liability interactions over time, but relation-
ship growth outside of this is assumed to equally affect all groups. Partial solutions
would be to measure number of years groups have known each other or to include
subjective measures of relationship strength.
Treated individuals in the experiments show moral discipline as hypothesised,
foregoing short-run gains from non-repayment to benefit from higher dynamic long-
run total earnings. A second-best policy of restricting rounds is however essential to
conclude significantly lower short-run earnings for treated group. First-best policy
would be to expand the dataset, sampling 20 % of all populations or exploring more
villages, particularly because of multicolinearity problems from the Hindu village of
Shahapara.
Hypothesis 3 states stronger social ties in treated groups encourages shouldering and
discourages free riding compared to control groups. Empirically this is well-proven
with treated groups 26.6 % more likely to shoulder and 27.4 % less likely to free ride
compared to control groups holding all else constant. By extension, different observ-
able characteristics affect the likelihood of shouldering or free riding differently.
Findings of shouldering being sensitive to physical and relational characteristics and
free riding to individuals’ situation are suggested.
The story for lenders, when selecting optimal borrowers in joint-liability, is to
choose predominantly women that are blood relatives and neighbours. To maximise
repayments, lenders must select those educated below Class 7 and in niche forms of
employment so they benefit from stronger work-community social ties. Homogenous
groups in sex, education and occupation should be formed. Optimum values based on
income and village are uncertain because of exogenously setting income outside of the
loss domain and inability to identify cultural differences between villages respectively.
The contemporary game theoretical application to joint-liability microcredit lending
is novel. There remains expansive scope for future literature. Extensions to this paper
include but are not limited to allowing observation of group incomes to a degree of
certainty to better replicate signals of repayment ability,41 and finding proxy variables to
measure unobservable behavioural characteristics which limit all empirical research in
microcredit.42 Alternative application of the experimental games can be made to test
social ties in solving moral hazard by setting income endogenously or in solving
adverse selection by comparing microcredit borrowers to those only deterred by high
41 This however raises ethical concerns, hence why it was avoided in this paper.
42 At best 38.7 % of the variability (R-squared) through observable characteristics for sustainability is
explained (rounds).
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interest rates. Experimental games can also be adapted to model comparisons between
joint-liability and other lending models such as individual-liability.
The paper finds significant evidence supporting theoretical hypotheses in
joint-liability microcredit lending. Nevertheless whether joint-liability is the optimal
lending model for alleviating world poverty remains undetermined.43
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